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Introduction
Cities under armed conflict become urban laboratories. Changes of their 
urban structure reflect intrinsic properties of the city, hardly noticeable in 
circumstances of stability. Not only does a conflict-conditioned urban trauma 
imply shattered spatial and social networks, it also removes memory from 
space, jeopardizing both city´s history and future. However, viewed through 
the lens of complexity, “trauma is an element that is not external, but intrin-
sically constitutive of a city´s organization” (Burke, 2010) – it defines the 
moment in which the urban system needs to reinvent itself in order not to 
disappear. In that sense, our object of study addresses an urban specificity that 
♠ ♦ ♣
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usually occurs in urban conflicts of high uncertainty: self-organization. This 
paper briefly exposes two cases that concern self-referential systems in war 
situations. The first case is the city of Mogadishu (Somalia) during the Octo-
ber 19931 pacification attempt by the U.S. Special Forces and the second is 
the city of Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina), held under siege for more than 
three and a half years, between April 1992 and December 1995, by Bosnian 
Serb troops. In both cases, armed conflict caused an increase of self-organiza-
tion in the urban system, changing its future unpredictably and irreversibly.
Self-organization under conflict
Anderson defines self-organization as a “phenomenon whereby sys-
tem-level patterns spontaneously arise solely from interactions among su-
bunits of the system” (Anderson, 2002). This is the spontaneous occurrence 
of nonlinear organizational patterns through interaction of the system´s ele-
ments.
In order to express the degree of self-organization of an urban structure, 
we need to perceive the city as a complex urban system. Here, we unders-
tand complexity as “a measure of the number of possible states a system can 
adopt” (Wagensberg, 2010) and assume that the organization of the city is 
“the integration and interaction of different, often both conflicting and com-
plementary elements” (Ruiz, 2001). The city needs maintenance to avoid deg-
radation; its stability is maintained through partial laws of disorganization 
and reorganization, described by processes of organization and disorganiza-
tion (Ruiz, Op. cit.) These laws, built over time, are transformed under con-
flict and a self-referential process based on adaptability is initiated. Processes 
of self-organization partly depend on the random factor, and, in turn, allow 
the city´s endurance through multiple consecutive steady states, unpredictable 
and selective at the same time.
This loss of stability leads to the realm of  adaptability, defined as the sys-
tem´s resilience to increased environmental uncertainty. In that sense, adap-
table and adaptive systems are reciprocal. In order to survive changes in its 
environment, a system must test its ability to evolve by: (a) increasing its 
1  In 2013, the authors of this article published a paper on topological representation of the Battle 
of Mogadishu through application of the graph theory (Aquilué and Ruiz, 2013). 
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complexity, i.e. increasing the number of accessible states without losing its 
identity, (b) increasing the capacity to anticipate changes within the environ-
ment, (c) increasing its control over the immediate environment or (d) suita-
bly combining all the above. (Wagensberg, op. cit.)
Self-regulation of a system based on autoproduction is a process of auto-
poiesis, which allows system to reproduce, organize and maintain itself while 
preserving its autonomy from the environment. The elements of autopoietic 
systems form the network of actions that produce them and are observed 
from their own spatial unity. It is important to stress that this type of system 
constitutes itself as a concrete unity in space and time.
An autopoietic system constantly distinguishes itself from the environ-
ment. It is noteworthy that its limits are defined homeostatically and that 
changes in the environment imply self-organization of the system through a 
set of processes, which can cause changes in the system, but never devoid it of 
its identity. An autopoietic system is characterized by:
• Autonomy, in the sense that the autopoietic machinery integrates chang-
es into maintenance of the system´s organization.
• Individuality in the sense that the autopoietic machinery maintains its 
own identity independent of any mutual action between the system and 
its environment by a repeated reproduction and maintenance of its or-
ganization.
• Self-determination of the boundaries of the system. 
• Absence (or specificity) of input-output relationship: self-regulation. 
(Ruiz, op. cit.)
Self-regulation is a part of system’s nonlinear organization, which ena-
bles it to change and evolve. The nonlinearity allows us to express the essence 
of change. Under certain stimuli, fluctuations of an open system cease to be 
mere seasonal fluctuations that maintain the system stable, to become fluc-
tuations capable of causing changes in the system. Systems no longer adapt 
but rather tend towards new unpredictable states, devoid of stability and 
equilibrium – reaching a state of uncertainty that involves a change in their 
macroscopic structure. These are the dissipative structures (Wagensberg, op. 
cit.). As a system moves away from equilibrium, the complexity – understood 
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as all possible and available options for the system that are compatible with 
its environment ─ increases. As the diagram shows [see Figure 1], fluctuations 
(which in a stable state tend to return to the starting point) in a dissipative 
structure bifurcate, shooting up the number of possible options.
Figure 1: Order by fluctuations. Source: WAGENSBERG, J. (1985), Ideas sobre la compleji-
dad del mundo. Barcelona: Tusquets Editores.
Self-organization case 1: 3 October 1993. Battle of Mogadishu.
Macroscopic self-organization of the city awakens in urban systems 
under conflict. In Mogadishu, autopoietic individuality responded with a 
self-referential offensive action to prevent the foreign incursion.
In the afternoon of October 3, 75 Rangers and 40 Delta Force comman-
dos left the base located in the vicinity of the Mogadishu Airport to reach 
their target in the central Wardhiigley (Black Sea) district, near the Bakara 
market, in the heart of the ‘hostile’ area, fully controlled by the warlord Mo-
hamed Farrah Aidid. The Rangers and Delta Force troops crossed the western 
part of the city by air, and at 15:42, descended on the intricate street network 
of Mogadishu (Edwards, 2000).
The plan was to break into a meeting of Habar Gidir clan leaders that 
two top Aidid´s lieutenants would attend. The target building was on Hawl-
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wadig Road, opposite the Olympic Hotel. The instructions were clear: secure 
the largest possible number of hostages and transport them five kilometres 
back to base on a convoy of twelve vehicles. This was supposed to be a quick 
hostage snatch mission, with an estimated duration of thirty minutes.
The Somali interpreted the Special Forces raid on Wardhiigley district 
as an intrusion into the area controlled by Aidid’s militia, and responded to 
it like antibodies to a virus. The militia took up guns, rifles and RPGs [rock-
et-propelled grenades], anti-tank weapons designed to shoot down armored 
vehicles, and went out to meet Ranger and Delta Force troops in an arduous 
and violent defensive attack.
The militia formed part of the Somali National Army [SNA]. It was com-
prised of between 1,000 and 12,000 men2 and organized into 18 military 
sectors located throughout the city of Mogadishu.
Figure 2: Soldiers of Somali Militia in Mogadishu’s street. Source: Photography of Jim 
Stephens in: HUBAND, M. (2001) The Skull beneath the Skin: Africa after the Cold War, 
Colorado: Westview Press.
Initially, the mission proceeded well for the Americans. Thanks to a rapid 
intervention within the target building, twenty-four Somalis linked to Habar 
Gidir clan, who attended the meeting were taken prisoners. But the mission 
began to fall apart when a Blackhawk helicopter was hit by militia´s RPG and 
shot down four blocks east of the target building. Just twenty minutes later, 
2  The data are equivocal, since the range between 1,000 and 12,000 militiamen is very wide. These 
data proceed from the U.S. Army, that doesn´t know the exact number of casualties and it is important 
to stress that, apart from the militia, many civilians took up weapons that day.
[ 68 ]
ur
ba
n 
SE
P2
01
4 
- A
GO
20
15
N
S0
8-
09
AR
TÍ
CU
LO
S 
Y 
N
OT
AS
 D
E 
IN
VE
ST
IG
AC
IÓ
N
 / 
AR
TI
CL
ES
 A
N
D 
RE
SE
AR
CH
 N
OT
ES
URBAN TRAUMA AND SELF-ORGANIZATION OF THE CITY
the second Blackhawk also plummeted to the ground only a kilometer and a 
half away (Bowden, 1999). Light infantry troops that had been sent to cover 
the target building were ordered to move to the first crash site and secure it. 
In order to reach the site, the soldiers had to go through four street blocks – a 
space packed with Somali guerrillas armed with rifles and machine guns. The 
convoy holding the twenty-four Somalis received orders to secure the second 
crash site, but it never made it. All routes from the target building to the sec-
ond site were blocked, impeding the access to the Blackhawk 6-4. The streets 
were dotted with improvised barricades, and all the roofs were full of armed 
Somalis unleashing bursts of fire on their opponents.
The Somali anticipated that the ground troops [who had fast-roped from 
the Blackhawks helicopters] could not leave the hostile area using helicopters 
[the streets and public spaces were too narrow for a landing]. Aware of the 
need for a relief convoy, the guerrillas set up roadblocks across the city. The 
Somali were continuously opening fire from every building or vehicle at every 
single intersection in Wardhiigley District. Because of the impossibility to 
blend into the surroundings, the Rangers and Delta Force troops were sitting 
ducks for their enemy. The militia controlled the battlefield.
Somali guerrillas acted autonomously. Their strategy was to swarm from 
every possible point of urban geometry – roofs, windows, doors and aban-
doned buildings – towards the crash sites of both helicopters. Out in the 
streets, the militiamen were shouting <<Kasoobaxa guryaha oo iska celsa ca-
dowga! >> [<< Come out and defend your homes! >>] through megaphones 
(Edwards, op. cit.). Opposing militia clans, armed civilians and looters came 
together to fight the American platoons. Militia shared their weapons with 
civilians and looters and all of them converged on the areas surrounding the 
coordinates where U.S. troops held their positions.
Many of the Somalis who fought during those eighteen hours had no 
combat experience – their tactics were primitive. However, this did not inter-
fere with their ability of concealment. They would hide behind cars parked 
in the middle of the road or behind corners of narrow streets, discharging 
all their ammunition to bewildered and dazed troops. Wherever they moved, 
U.S. soldiers were ambushed by armed Somalis3, appearing from every possi-
ble place in the urban geometry of the built environment.
3  Somali artillery was a mixture of USSR assault rifles and NATO mines, machine guns and RPG-7s.
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Eighteen hours have passed since Blackhawks first overflew Mogadishu 
and Rangers slid from helicopters, until their return to protected area. Sol-
diers spent the night in the city without knowing how long they would remain 
on a mission that was not supposed to take longer than thirty minutes. The 
uncertainty of combat claimed a number of casualties.
In the battle of October 3, the urban system of Mogadishu received such 
an intense stimulus that it abandoned its steady state in order to survive (Wa-
gensberg, op. cit.). The environmental stimulus caused the bifurcations that 
keep the system away from its steady state – close to equilibrium – to move 
further away, ending up in an exceptional state where not only the survival 
of individuality but also its next state was at stake. In any case, this state led 
to a consequent change process, the essence of change, since change of state 
involves a change in the structure of the system.
The first stimulus was the incursion of Task Force Ranger in the heart of 
the Wardhiigley district. This stimulus, understood as a system of exchange 
of matter, energy and information, is scarce when compared to the entire city 
system. However, the environment caused irreversible fluctuation within the 
urban system. Observation of interference triggered the order by fluctuations, 
moving away from any situation of stability. The complex system agreed to 
an unstable state of multiple options and proceeded to self-regulation. Ine-
vitably, out of all possible bifurcations, the system followed a non-predeter-
mined path. The possible change is multifaceted and unpredictable; multiple 
possible states are part of the uncertainty of change (ibid.).
Figure 3: Order by fluctuations and the Battle of Mogadishu. Source: WAGENSBERG, J. 
(1985) Ideas sobre la complejidad del mundo. Barcelona: Tusquets Editores. 
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The stimulus triggers an inexorable process of self-regulation, which an 
autopoietic individuality should integrate into the organization of its own 
system – a capacity that emerges from its autonomy.
The increased uncertainty, caused by the environmental factors, is inevi-
tably compensated by the system, which has several options, as mentioned 
earlier. In the case of the Battle of Mogadishu, the city replied to increased 
uncertainty caused by the environment with an increase of its complexity, i.e. 
an increase of available states of its identity. The city with a pulsing capacity 
of combat quickly activated its ability and, without losing the identity, the 
system of the city enabled its subsystems to become agents in the battle – the 
city changed its state and its relational field has incremented. Increased uncer-
tainty was compensated with an ability of anticipation, which was embodied 
in the existence of the Mogadishu militia or the pre-establishment of certain 
signals, such as burning tires. The urban space also acted as an essential part 
of the battle – the more heterogeneous, diverse and complex space is, the 
better chance of survival a swarm has. In that sense, relational and topolo-
gical components are the key to a force deployment of a self-referential and 
self-organized swarm.
Figure 4: Graph representation of self-organization in the Battle of Mogadishu through a 
topological approach. Source: (AQUILUÉ, I.; RUIZ, J., 2012).
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Self-organization case 2: 1992-1995. The Siege of Sarajevo.
In the light of the combination of growing environmental uncertainty 
and increased entropy4 of the city, the system´s adaptability is activated. This 
need for transformation by means of new and precarious structures leads 
again to the emergence of self-organization concept.
One of the main determinants of changes in the urban structure of the 
city of Sarajevo was the alteration of its state at the beginning of the siege. 
When the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (a unit of the Army of the Republika 
Srpska – VRS), supported by the Yugoslav People’s Army – JNA (UN, 1994) 
and paramilitary forces (Donia, 2006) laid siege to the city, supply and mobi-
lity patterns were completely altered.
Map 1: Map of the Siege of Sarajevo. Source: the authors.
4  In conventional situations, cities steal order from their environment through negative entropy 
flow. In the case of siege, supply cut interrupts this flow, so the entropy (“disorder”) within the system 
increases.
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Snipers took position in some of the buildings occupied by Bosnian Serb 
troops and artillery, mortars, tanks and missiles were placed on the hills sur-
rounding the city. Short-circuit of gas, water and electricity lines, as well as 
blockade of accesses to the city, resulted in the modification of its structural 
system, its energy, its flows and the use of its roads. Isolation was a powerful 
weapon and one of the main goals of the attacking side.
Life conditions were appalling, water and electricity supply was intermi-
ttent, access to the city by conventional routes (roads and railways) was cut, 
public transport barely worked and the gas supply was almost nonexistent. 
The paradigm shift of subsistence led to a transformation in the urban life of 
the civilian population. Under such circumstances, various patterns of self-re-
ferential organization, driven by social and spatial elements of the urban sys-
tem emerged.
These disturbances produced variations in the use of both private and pu-
blic space, since the necessary self-organization of everyday survival activities 
led to a transmutation of their relation to space. These activities were highly 
constrained by the lack of energy and food supply, obstructed communication 
channels and restricted flow of people and vehicles. In this sense, mobility on 
the main roads was badly affected by the difficult use of motor vehicles and 
the exposure to the snipers (Razović and Wagner, 1993). Barricades began to 
appear in the streets (set up with cars, containers or bags) (Barranco, 2002). 
The new morphology of flows through the public space and the awareness of 
the existence of snipers conditioned the routs, varying its usual course.
The change of activities has distorted the urban space, not only changing 
the circulation patterns in it but also its original use. In residential buildings, 
the living room and hallways became firewood stores and community space 
lost its main functions. Residents were fully aware that every time they would 
hear the whistle of a missile or a grenade detonation, they would have to run 
down the stairwell, and take shelter in the building´s basement (Razović and 
Wagner, Op. cit.). Similarly, people moved within the city mostly through the 
corridors in the lower parts of the buildings5. Exposed parts were an easy tar-
get for snipers, mortars and missiles, due to the location of the Bosnian Serb 
troops in the surrounding hills.
5  Information obtained in an interview with an engineer Midhat Aganović, 21 February 2014.
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Figure 5: Self-organization and provision of supplies in Sarajevo. Source: Photography by 
Miquel Ruiz in: Ruiz, M. (2002), Sarajevo, Col·legi d’Arquitectes de Catalunya, Demarcació 
de Girona, Delegació Alt Empordà, Figueres.
Changes in the meaning of space also led to variations in its public use. 
Some houses became schools for small number of students; city parks lost all 
the trees and were replaced by cemeteries. The environment was modified on 
a large scale and urban life under siege emphasized supply networks between 
the civilian and surroundings. Self-organization of space, which resulted in 
new uses, together with self-referentiality of the social system made possible 
the survival of the urban system.
In fact, the lack of resources and the inability of the current administra-
tion to manage short-circuited supply networks resulted in a situation where 
organization plans and decisions were kept between non-hierarchical system 
elements and linked to the direct environment. The social and spatial self-or-
ganization increased the number of available states that had disappeared after 
the collapse of the socialist infrastructure and, therefore, became a paradigm 
of spatial management.
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Figure 6: View of the Bosnian Parliament in Sarajevo. Source: Photography of Miquel Ruiz 
in: RUIZ, M. (2002) Sarajevo. Figueres: Col·legi d’Arquitectes de Catalunya, Demarcació de 
Girona, Delegació Alt Empordà.
In terms of complexity, the system´s adaptability to shortage of supplies 
led to an increase of its complexity. The creation of new networks of self-or-
ganization was an adaptation factor that led to new available states, since the 
previous ones had been destroyed. Furthermore, in order to survive, the city 
has to anticipate not only armed defense, but also the strategies of mobility 
and use of space, clearly related to social systems. Open and public spaces 
changed their meaning, since the system had to adapt to environmental ag-
gressions.
Conclusions
The post-traumatic condition is tabula rasa: “when the normal run of 
things is traumatically interrupted, the field is then opened up for a discursive 
ideological competition” (Žižek, 2009). This vacuum, without any mecha-
nism of control, may be exposed and vulnerable to entry of predator systems 
that seek to dominate and try to erase trauma from memory, imposing order 
through the frantic reconstruction and its imaginary. But at the same time, 
the resilience mechanisms of the urban system – its ability to adapt to violent 
disruptions – are exposed and rendered visible in the urban and social fabric 
(Burke, op. cit.).
Therefore, the processes of self-organization and increase in the com-
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plexity are powerful survival mechanisms of the urban system; moreover, 
they are able to fill in the void left by traumatic disruption and discontinuity, 
allowing the reestablishment of links between spatial and collective memory.
The field of urban complexity allows to connect trauma and self-orga-
nization. Despite the fact that adaptation to urban conflict does not always 
occur through self-referential processes, trauma and adaptability often cause 
production of autopoietic systems. In that sense, both Mogadishu insurgents 
and Sarajevo besieged civilians generated trauma-induced self-referential re-
lational fields through complex processes, caused by the possible states to 
which the systems were subjected.
These possible states of the complex urban system enable its elements to 
be produced and organized autonomously. The acceleration of the elements, 
produced by the trauma, modifies the system´s stable states, and thus deter-
mines its possible states, causing divergent urban futures, subjected to the 
post-traumatic condition.
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